Over the last 30 years, Chinese commercial real estate markets have joined the global universe of investable assets, as exemplified by vibrant skylines and the construction of startling new buildings in megacities. Despite the large volume of foreign direct investments in Chinese commercial real estate markets, there has been little academic research done to analyse and characterize the risk structure of Chinese commercial properties. Using a database never applied before in academic literature, this paper fills in the gap by studying the risk characteristics of direct property investments in Chinese first-tier cities. It applies macrovariable models to analyse the risk structure of office properties in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. It then tests a selection of instruments that could be used by international investors to hedge the risk of investing in these three sub-markets. It concludes by making a series of recommendations that could help international investors deal with the risk of direct investments in China's property markets.
INTRODUCTION
Few sights are as striking as first-tier Chinese cities when it comes to witnessing the actual effects of economic growth and urbanization on China. Megacities mirror the drastic changes undergone by the Chinese economy since 1979 when Deng Xiaoping decided to put an end to the Maoist era and initiated a new 'Open Door Policy'. Following the entry of China in the World Trade Organization in December 2001, the pace of economic growth has continued unabated, resulting in more intense urbanization and construction projects on a scale unknown before. The tenets of China's miracle growth are well known (Brandt and Rawski, 2008) whereas their repercussions on commercial real estate are still somewhat of an urban myth. Over the past 10 years, Chinese real estate markets have joined the global universe of investable assets as exemplified by vibrant skylines and the construction of startling commercial properties in Chinese megacities. It is now difficult to ignore a market ranked as the third largest globally by invested stock (DTZ, 2012) . In recent months, several international financial powerhouses reputed for their business acumen and a track record of savvy investments (e.g. Soros, KKR) have decided to enter the Chinese direct commercial real estate markets, hoping for many happy, albeit possibly somewhat late, returns 1 . International investors who are often mesmerized by the historical growth and potential size of the Chinese economy, as well as the reassurance by Chinese authorities that their commercial property markets are sound, might not have a clear understanding of the nature of the risk they face in China. Notwithstanding the focus on operational and legal risks whose need was emphasized by some highly publicised cases of international investors being caught in the complex system of Chinese guanxi, international investors venturing into the Chinese direct property markets are faced with many macro risks that have to be addressed 2
. Surprisingly, despite the large volume of foreign investments in the Chinese commercial real estate markets, there has been little academic research done to analyse and characterise the risk structure of Chinese direct commercial properties. As a matter of fact, whilst research on securitized real estate markets in Greater China is quite frequent (e.g. Liow and Newell, 2010) , studies pertaining to the Chinese direct real estate markets are scarce, due in large part to the difficulty to access relevant data. For instance, Tse, Chiang, and Raftery analyse the risk of office properties in Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzen based on the Security Market Line but their paper dates back to 1999.
Academics have considered the issue of inflation hedging and direct real estate in the Chinese context (Chu and Sing, 2004; Lecomte, 2012) but have not applied to China the type of analysis that has been used to scrutinize commercial properties in Western markets (e.g. Kling and McCue, 1987; Geltner, 1989; Ling and Naranjo, 1997; Liang and McIntosh, 1998) .
Using a database never applied before in the academic literature, this paper fills in the gap by studying the risk characteristics of direct office property investments in three first-tier Chinese cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou). The paper addresses two research questions: First, what is the nature of real estate risk in Chinese office markets? Secondly, how can Chinese real estate risk be hedged by international investors going directly into these sub-markets, especially in case of a hard landing of the Chinese economy? To answer these questions, the paper is organized according to three sections.
In section I, the paper introduces the context surrounding office properties in the three cities under investigation and the role of foreign investors in these markets created ex nihilo over the last 30 years.
In section II, the paper implements two classic financial frameworks, i.e. CAPM after Tse, Chiang and Raftery (1999) , and macroeconomic variable models (aka MVM) after Chen, Hsieh and Jordan (1997) , in order to analyse the risk structure of Chinese direct office properties in the three cities under study. In section III, the analysis replicates Chinese direct office returns and tests a selection of possible hedges (cross-hedges and index-based hedges) that could be used by international investors to manage the risk of investing in these sub-markets. The last section draws on Riddiough (1995) who studies the use of multi-factor cross-hedging instruments in US direct commercial property markets.
of actors in the global real estate industry. For instance, in May 2012, Tishman-Speyer announced the launch of a RMB 1.2 bln real estate fund aimed at direct investments in China, the first fund raised by a foreign developer.
2 Guanxi is a Chinese word that refers to the intricate network of connections necessary to do business in China.
building was foreign to this archetypal city, notwithstanding the notable exception of Shanghai whose famous Bund and central district welcomed the headquarters of an array of foreign companies. The socialist city as envisioned by the Maoist ideology aimed to turn cities into production centres at a time when the Chinese economy was entirely geared towards manufacturing activities. These producer cities, as opposed to the consumer cities of capitalism, had no space and no need for office buildings. With the opening of the Chinese economy to the world, everything changed. The establishment of Development Zone Planning helped reorganizing cities around massive planned areas designed to attract outside capital investments (Gaubatz, 1999) . For instance, the creation of a financial district in Shanghai benefited greatly from a systematic policy that welcomed foreign investments provided very constraining locational requirements. In 1997-1998, licenses were granted to eight foreign banks to operate in renminbi, with the geographical restriction that they had to be located in Shanghai Pudong new area or in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (Lardy, 2002) . These restrictions on foreign banks were in place until 2005. Likewise, foreign insurance companies and other professional services, such as accounting, law, architecture and engineering were submitted to strict locational restrictions until 2010 when they were eventually lifted 3 .
3 Geographical and project restrictions on foreign investments in real estate were lifted as part of the WTO agreement whereby China committed to progressively liberalize its real estate markets (He et al., 2011) .
Office Markets in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou
Chinese planning policies have thus fostered the development of CBD concentrating all grade A quality supply around a few economic clusters. Chen and Hao, 2008) . Shanghai has two business districts: Puxi which is the city's historical center and Pudong to the East.
 Guangzhou: Guangzhou is the capital city of the South China's Guangdong Province.
Although a first-tier city like Beijing and Shanghai, it cannot claim the same clout.
Guangzhou has traditionally enjoyed a positive economic outlook due to its location in the Pearl River Delta, one of China's main manufacturing and commercial regions. Various schemes were implemented in the 1990s to help foster the city's trade and manufacturing base (Free Trade Zone, Nansha Export Processing Zone). Guangzhou's airport is the country's second busiest airport in terms of freight movements. In the early 2000, China's transition away from the export-driven development economic paradigm has meant that costal hubs such as Guangzhou have entered a more mature, less exciting, growth pattern (Ness and Kramer, 2012) .
Real estate investments and international investors in Chinese megacities
The development of Chinese property markets has been highly successful so far. In 2011, as investments amounted to 50% of GDP, real estate accounted for 23% of all fixed asset investments in China. Geng and N'Diaye (2012) estimate that the real estate sector represents over 10% of the Chinese economy, with the bulk of the activity stemming from the eastern provinces. In 2011, the volume of transactions for all property types in the three cities under study was $57bln (Real Capital Analytics, 2012 
MODELING CHINESE DIRECT REAL ESTATE RISK
In this section, we introduce the data and theoretical frameworks used to model Chinese direct real estate returns. We first analyse Chinese property returns using the CAPM (after Tse et al., 1999 ).
Once we have characterized the risk structure in terms of systematic and idiosyncratic risks, we apply a MVM framework (after Chen, Hsieh, and Jordan, 1997) . This enables us to model Chinese direct real estate returns based on a selection of macroeconomic variables.
Data and methodology
 Property returns at the city level CBRE Capital Return indices for the Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou's office markets are used as proxies for the direct office market in the three cities. All data are year on year quarterly returns in local currency from Q12002 to Q42010 (i.e. 9 years or 36 observations -National office market index 2: equal weightage for the three cities (neutral weights).
Descriptive statistics for the two national indices are reported in Table 1 above (Panel B).
 Macroeconomic variables
Macroeconomic variables are selected to explain office property capital returns. Due the possible lack of convergence of economic data in a transitional economy like China, we decide to collect macroeconomic variables at the city level, rather than the country level, whenever available 11 .
Hence, city level data are collected from China's National Bureau of Statistics in order to explain city level office property capital returns. The process is relatively easy for Beijing and Shanghai but more difficult for Guangzhou where detailed time series at the city level are not available for all variables included in the analysis. Although the analysis aims for maximum consistency across cities, all three sub-markets are not analysed according to the same factors as some variables are not available for all three cities over the full period under study (Q12002-Q42010). In particular, the business climate index and entrepreneur index are available over the period Q42004-Q42010 in Beijing. Only the business climate index is available in Shanghai (Q12004-Q42010) whereas none of the two indices are available in Guangzhou. Table 2 at capturing value created by intangibles provided by the service sector, which might have a significant impact on office property markets. Once again, the pragmatic 'second best' approach has to be adopted.
[INSERT TABLE 2]  Methodology: single beta model and macrovariable model
The analysis is conducted in two steps. In the first step, we apply a simple CAPM framework to year on year quarterly office property capital returns at the city level and break down total risk between systematic risk and unsystematic risk over the full 9-year period (Q12002-Q42010) using the two above-mentioned national office market indices as a proxy for China's office market. We compute the beta for each sub-market and infer from this analysis the sub-market with the largest amount of total risk and that with the largest idiosyncratic risk. In the second step, we apply a multivariate regression model to explain office property capital returns with a selection of city level and national macrovariables. A stepwise regression method is used whereby an optimal model is determined for each city level office property capital return index (dependent variable)
based on a selection of macro-variables (independent variables). The criteria for determining the optimal model is based on the following rule: for each dependent variable, a model is optimal when the coefficient of determination of the regression (Adjusted R 2 ) is maximized while multicollinearity of the included independent variables is under control (i.e., individual Variance
Inflation Factor-VIF-inferior or close to 2.5 for each macro-variable included in the optimal model 13 ). This analysis is conducted according to two timeframes 
Results

 CAPM analysis -Systematic risk vs. idiosyncratic risk
Sharpe ratios reported in table 1 above indicate that Shanghai is by far the most attractive city among the three cities under study in terms of risk/return trade-off (Sharpe ratio: 0.897). Beijing records a slightly negative Sharpe ratio as its average capital return is lower than the average risk free rate over the period. Guangzhou is flatly dominated by Shanghai. Of course, this analysis is only partial as rentals may play a big role in each city's expected return and, consequently, potential attractiveness to investors. Table 3 below summarises the results of the CAPM based analysis.
[INSERT TABLE 3]
The analysis consistently indicates that of the three cities, Guangzhou is the riskiest. Its standard deviation is the largest in the group (8.42%), followed by Shanghai (6.77%) and Beijing (5.02%). By the same token, irrespective of the office market index used as a proxy for the national office market, risk in the three cities is overwhelmingly idiosyncratic. In relative terms, Beijing's total risk appears to be the most systematic whereas Shanghai's total risk and, to an even greater extent, Guangzhou's total risk are dominated by idiosyncratic risk, illustrating the fact these two cities' office markets are influenced by unique factors. Idiosyncratic risk is on average twice as large in Guangzhou than in Beijing. These findings are consistent with Tse et al. (1999) who also identify Shanghai's office market as the most attractive in terms of risk/return and Guangzhou's as the most volatile and idiosyncratic office market over the period 1991-1997. Their analysis is based on total returns whereas this paper only covers capital returns. Although it is difficult to compare the findings given the use of different property market proxies, it is striking to note the contrast in overall volatility between the two studies 15 .
Returns over the period 2002-2010 are much less volatile than those used in Tse et al. (1999) over the previous decade (e.g. in the case of Shanghai: 6.77% vs. 13.09% over 1991-1997),
which could hint at a certain form of maturing process for Chinese megacities' commercial property markets since the WTO accession.
 Macrovariable Models (MVM)
Results describing the optimal macrovariable models for the three sub-markets are presented as follows:
-In appendix 1 for the full period Q12002-Q42010 and the two sub-periods (from WTO to Sub-prime: Q12002-Q42007, and post Global Financial Crisis: Q12008-Q42010);
-In appendix 2 for the five 5-year rolling periods.
15 Tse et al.'s market indices are somewhat biased insofar as they only include four Southern cities (Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Hong Kong). In that respect, no matter how imperfect, our national office market indices which encompass the three largest megacities in the eastern provinces from North to South are more representative of the Chinese national market. whereas Guangzhou sub-market is affected by shorter term, more volatile variables (3-month T Bill and FTSE Xinhua A50) coupled with population. In that sense, Beijing appears like the ultimate macro city in the group. In contrast, Shanghai is the quirkiest. The comparison between the two sub-periods reveal that the sub-prime crisis had an impact on the three submarkets' risk structures. In the early part of the decade, the WTO accession and the resulting breakneck economic growth translate into the optimal models. Shanghai office returns are driven by GDP 16 . Likewise, Guangzhou market is driven by population and private consumption. Interestingly, post Global Financial Crisis, optimal models tend to differ: expected inflation becomes a significant factor in Beijing while Shanghai's business climate starts to matter.
The 5-year rolling period analysis (Appendix 2) confirms the previous findings. Whilst
Beijing office market is dominated by national variables (i.e. long term rate and private consumption), Shanghai office market is overwhelmingly driven by local variables, which epitomizes its idiosyncratic dimension. Macrovariable models are overall less efficient at capturing Shanghai's risk than in the two other cities. With respect to Guangzhou, demographics play an important role in the city's property market, whereas it has a more limited impact in the two other markets. Interestingly, in the last 5-year period (Q12006-Q42010), the strong presence of expected inflation (Beijing) and unexpected inflation 16 Interestingly, β(Local GDP) in Shanghai's optimal models (reported in appendices 1 & 2) are consistently negative (significant at 1% level). A possible explanation for this counterintuitive finding lies in the nature of the proxy used for the city's direct office market. The CBRE index is focused on Grade A properties in the historic core CBD area (within Puxi) while in recent years, Shanghai has witnessed the emergence of a decentralized Grade A office market in Puxi and Pudong (between Inner Ring Road and Middle Ring Road), in part owing to improved public transportation (Jones Lang LaSalle, 2009). On average, decentralized space has been 30% cheaper than CBD space, attracting tenants from manufacturing, technology and other industries. As over half of decentralized tenants are former CBD tenants, high profile office locations in core CBD are now mostly favoured by tenants in the financial, legal and professional services. Hence, paradoxically, as Shanghai's GDP has grown, increased downward pressures might be exercised on core CBD office capital returns over the period under study.
(Shanghai) in the optimal models embodies the changing nature of real estate risk post Global Financial Crisis as well as investors' concern about China's inflation risk (Lecomte, 2012) .
 Synthesis
In sum, risk in the three sub-markets significantly differs 17 . Although replicating office market returns using macrovariables yields contrasting results (average Adj. R 2 over all periods: 0.886 for Beijing; 0.596 for Shanghai; 0.878 for Guangzhou), a pattern can be drawn.
Beijing and Guangzhou are both macroeconomic plays, the former with a long-term perspective, the latter with a shorter term (and thus more volatile) focus. Guangzhou office market which is highly volatile is dominated by its larger peers. Investors looking for a stable macro bet on China's long term prospects as captured by national macroeconomic indicators (i.e. long term rate, private consumption, money supply) should select the Beijing office market over Shanghai. Conversely, investors looking for unique investment opportunities should select Shanghai office market which, overall, offered the best investment opportunities over the period under study. The city's idiosyncratic nature and resolutely local dimension might even add some diversification benefits to a portfolio of Chinese assets.
HEDGING CHINESE DIRECT REAL ESTATE RISK
Faced with risks which are largely macro, international investors have no easy way to hedge their investments in Chinese properties. Noticeably, although being part of the broader Chinese real estate market, each sub-market's risk structure is very different and, therefore, requires a specific
hedge. The previous analysis shows that macrovariables can be successfully used to model and replicate real estate returns. Thus, they would provide efficient hedges against volatility in capital returns for the three sub-markets under study, albeit at different levels depending on the city.
However, the market for macroeconomic derivatives is not currently functioning in the West, let alone in China. Likewise, the fledging property derivatives market developed in Europe and in the US over the last decade has hardly expanded in Asia yet, with the exception of Australia and Hong Kong. Hence, what can be the alternative for international investors looking for ways to hedge their exposure to direct property investments in China? The paper addresses this question by scanning the hedging effectiveness of an array of potential cross-hedging instruments listed on public markets. The approach described thereafter is designed mainly with US investors in mind. 17 The question of differentiation among local real estate markets in a transitional economy like China is linked to the broader issue of 'law of one price'. When factor pricing differs widely from one region to another, one would expect very sharp contrast from one local real estate market to another. On the other hand, urban growth in Chinese megacities which stems from deliberate choices in terms of economic bases might ultimately foster the convergence of local property markets towards a national average.
Potential Cross-Hedges
The paper explores seven potential sources of cross-hedges for Chinese direct real estate. These instruments cover a wide range of market segments, from real estate in China to commodities in Overall, 27 potential cross-hedging instruments from a wide range of sectors are included in the analysis. Appendix 3 presents a summary of these instruments.
Data and methodology
For all 27 identified potential cross-hedge underlying instruments, closing prices are collected from Bloomberg. We compute year on year quarterly returns in Chinese renminbi for the period Q12002-Q42010. When data are not available over the full period (i.e. in case of a listing start date posterior to Q12001), year on year quarterly returns are computed for the longest available sub-period over the full period under study. Office market capital returns for the three cities are computed as before. Table 5 summarizes the descriptive statistics.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
Given that not all 27 underlying instruments are traded over the full period Q12002-Q42010, the paper breaks down the analysis into 3 sub-periods. Any instrument whose year-on-year quarterly returns are available during the timeframe of the three periods is included into the corresponding Best hedges are identified according to Ederington (1979) . For single hedges, the optimal hedge is the one that maximizes the coefficient of determination of the regression between office market capital 19 The number of observations in our sample for each period is as follows: 32 (Q12003-Q42010); 16 (Q12007-Q42010); 8 (Q12009-Q42010). This analysis, although limited by data availability, puts us in the exact same position as an international investor looking for a cross-hedge. Most cross hedges selected in the paper have been trading for less than 4 years.
returns (dependent variable) and the cross hedging instrument, i.e. one of the 27 potential underlying instruments (independent variable). For combination and hybrid hedges, we apply a stepwise regression to determine the optimal model maximizing the coefficient of determination (Adj. R 2 ) of the regression between office market capital returns (dependent variable) and selected underlyings (independent variables), i.e. up to three cross-hedging instruments from our sample of cross hedges, or an hybrid selection of one cross-hedging instrument and macrovariables. The optimal model is selected so that all included cross-hedging instruments and macrovariables have their VIF coefficient inferior or close to 2.5.
Results
 Correlations
Pairwise correlations between the three cities' office property market returns and cross-hedging instruments over the full period of availability for each time series (as reported in As explained in the previous section, Chinese direct real estate which mirrors strong fundamentals and local market dynamics is largely driven by macrovariables, either national or local. This is all the more true for first tier cities' office markets which are at the forefront of China's new economic geography. Weak correlations of direct property returns with a broad range of listed securities, especially China real estate ETFs and China country funds, indicate that these cross-hedging instruments which are dominated by highly volatile stock market factors may fail to fully capture the Chinese economy's macro-trends as reflected in direct real estate markets 21 .
 Single hedges
Best single hedges' effectiveness and component over the three periods are reported in table 6.
[INSERT Nevertheless, as exemplified by their lack of consistency over the three periods under study, single hedges do not seem very efficient at capturing direct real estate risk.
 Combined hedges
In an attempt to foster hedging effectiveness, we test the combination of up to three cross-hedging instruments within one hedge called combined hedge. Optimal models are reported in table 7.
[INSERT TABLE 7]
Strong multicollinearity between cross-hedging instruments limits the choice of optimal models, thereby imposing a large constraint on combined hedges' overall effectiveness. Nonetheless, the 
 Hybrid hedges
We combine the above-mentioned 27 cross-hedging instruments with macrovariables used in the MVM section of this paper. Given that overall R 2 achieved by optimal macrovariable models are higher than those obtained with cross-hedging instruments (Appendices 1 and 2), hybrid hedges should spur investors' ability to cover direct real estate risk. The analysis is carried out for each city over the three periods. This approach is purely theoretical inasmuch as there is no functioning market for economic derivatives in the world, let alone in China
24
. It follows Riddiough (1995) which replicates US commercial real estate returns by combining traded and over-the-counter instruments 23 Over the period Q12003-Q42010, an investor being long office property in Shanghai would have achieved a hedging effectiveness of 0.527 by going short Peabody Energy and Rio Tinto and long Capitaland (see Table 7 Panel B). 24 Orlik (2012) explains that the release of economic indicators in China is marred by leaks and rumours. For instance, the quarterly GDP is announced to the financial press 15 minutes ahead of the public announcement (under embargo). In practice, Chinese news organizations break the embargo with impunity in order to gain a competitive advantage. Any market on economic derivatives (e.g. a parimutuel auction market as described in Barrau, Zerda, Wang, and Argaiz, 2005) would suppose that the way Chinese economic indicators are released be sorted.
(up to 3 instruments in each hedge including economic variables such as the CPI and change in national office construction spending). Results of our analysis are reported in table 8.
[INSERT TABLE 8]
Apart from a few cases, optimal hedges are truly hybrid, i.e. combining one cross-hedging instrument with at least one macrovariable. On average over the three periods, hedging effectiveness is significantly improved by the use of hybrid hedges. The case of Beijing is striking. Over the long period Q12003-Q42010, hedging effectiveness reaches 0.867 (vs. 0.313 for combined hedge).
Interestingly, macrovariables, both national (long term rate) and local (population, per capita disposable income), are the most significant in the optimal models. On average for the three cities, optimal hedges contain 3.11 instruments. Table 9 summarizes the levels of hedging effectiveness achieved by the three types of hedge analysed in the paper: single, combined and hybrid.
[INSERT TABLE 9]
Without a doubt, hybrid hedges deliver superior hedging effectiveness and dominate the two other types of cross-hedge. In the context of the Chinese economy which has been changing very rapidly over the last decade, this concept applied to real estate is very relevant, by encompassing national macro trends, local characteristics and property markets' idiosyncrasies.
Comparison of Cross-Hedges with Index-Based Derivatives
Finally, the paper explores how index-based derivatives would compare to cross-hedges analysed before. Derivatives on Chinese real estate market or sub-markets do not exist yet but as China's commercial real estate indices become more robust, they are bound to appear, starting with OTC swaps. The study deals with office capital returns and is therefore concerned about capital return swaps. To design such instruments, an index is needed. IPD has recently launched a series of annual indices on the Chinese real estate market at the national level with sub-indices by property type and return type. IPD indices' time series go back to 2007. We select the China Office Capital Growth Index as underlying to Capital Return Swaps (CRS). We assume the swap is structured with two legs following the traditional UK model of property swaps as symbolized on Figure 1 : on the one hand the IPD China Office Capital Growth annual index, on the other hand a fixed rate.
FIGURE 1: Capital Return Swap on IPD China Office Index
Pricing accurately the fixed rate on a China property swap is a complex theoretical question. This study aims to come up with a reasonable approximation. As mentioned by the Investment Property
Forum (2010), given that the underlying index is not investable, pricing cannot be a small margin over
. It is primarily determined by investor expectations of returns. In the UK, on average, the risk premium for holding property is in the order of 2-3% over risk free rate. We decide to price the fixed leg of the swap by applying a 3% spread over China's 1-year T Bill rate. Table 10 presents the CRS' fixed rate for each year as well as annual hedged returns for the three cities' office markets (under a naïve hedging strategy).
[INSERT TABLE 10]
Thanks to strong correlation between IPD China Capital Growth index and the Beijing office market, a hedging strategy based on a CRS significantly improves the risk/return trade-off for office properties in Beijing (e.g. capital returns' coefficient of variation= 0.35 hedged vs. 0.66 unhedged).
However, the index-based swap does not work for Shanghai and Guangzhou whose capital returns show none or weak correlation with the underlying index's returns. This finding raises questions about the concept of national property market in a gigantic and diverse country. In a nascent property market such as China's where discrepancies among cities are very significant (as embodied by the fact the law of one price does not hold), using a national index as underlying for a hedge at the city level is not efficient. As China' economic geography is in the process of being defined, relying on indexbased derivatives can only be second best until highly specific city level sub-indices are developed.
Short of that, cross-hedges including economic derivatives are better alternatives for investors.
25 Patel and Pereira (2007) explain that in the case of a leg based on Libor + Spread (i.e. the initial model of UK index-based property swap), pricing the spread depends on two variables: volatility of returns (the higher volatility of the underlying, the higher the spread) and counterparty risk. real estate markets along with these markets' untested liquidity in case of crisis might eventually be a catalyst to introduce new hedging tools such as customizable hybrid hedges or, more prosaically, instruments based on narrow sub-indices, thereby enabling investors to deal with risks whose significance can reasonably be expected to grow, in size and intensity, in the coming years. As a first 26 Our findings can also help shed some light on the rationale behind US hedge funds' recent interest in Chinese direct real estate. Macro investors like Soros have identified that direct real estate does offer a macro bet on China's economy whereas other investment vehicles (e.g. listed real estate companies, commodities…) are influenced by exogenous factors which interfere with their ability to track the Chinese economy. Hence, in the absence of economic derivatives or renminbi currency plays, direct real estate has become a vehicle of choice for savvy macro investors willing to bet on China's real economy. Note: All second factors reported above are significant at 1% level except those denoted ** (5% level) and * (10% level and above). 
